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THE “CREATING AROUND” PARADOX 
RESPONDING TO JOSEPH P. FISHMAN, CREATING 
AROUND COPYRIGHT, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015) 
Dan L. Burk∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his article Creating Around Copyright, Joseph Fishman advances 
the provocative and significant thesis that the constraints imposed by 
copyright law exclusivity promote the creativity of subsequent follow-
on authors.1  Copyright law is generally regarded as promoting crea-
tivity by enhancing the choices available to creators, as offering exclu-
sive rights that make creative opportunities financially viable where 
they might otherwise seem economically infeasible or unattractive.2  
And much also has been said about the opportunities that are thus lost 
due to the restriction of copyright’s exclusivity, which shuts follow-on 
authors out of certain creative choices that are preempted by existing 
works.3  But Fishman argues, perhaps counterintuitively, that by lim-
iting creative choices, copyright exclusivity actually enhances the out-
put of follow-on authors by requiring them to “create around” existing 
works. 
As evidence of this effect, Fishman proffers both anecdotal and ex-
perimental indications of creating around.  Fishman notes, for exam-
ple, that Star Wars creator George Lucas initially hoped to license 
movie rights to the existing Flash Gordon outer space character, but 
negotiations failed.4  The inaccessibility of the Flash Gordon property 
forced Lucas to develop his own space opera, which ultimately proved 
to be at least as popular as, and by many measures far more successful 
than, the copyrighted work that inspired it.  Fishman offers other ex-
amples of such failed licensing attempts that ultimately resulted in the 
creation of alternative works, such as the Nintendo video game char-
acter Mario, which was initially intended to be the cartoon character 
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Popeye.5  Fishman ties these examples to work in experimental psy-
chology showing that constraint on creative choices may lead to great-
er creative output, and argues that the constraints on creation stem-
ming from copyright exclusivity may function to further the 
production of new works. 
Yet embedded in Fishman’s theory is a paradox that threatens to 
disable the putative benefits of creating around.  Specifically, the con-
ditions that are necessary for creating around are the same conditions 
that we would expect to lead to licensing of existing works, rather than 
the creation of new ones.  In other words, it appears that creating 
around can only occur when we would expect it not to occur.  This 
paradox draws out additional features of Fishman’s comparison to pa-
tent law.  In this Response, I illuminate this problem, showing how the 
logic of Fishman’s argument leads inevitably to this paradox.  This 
conundrum presents a problem for Fishman’s analysis, but I suggest it 
is not necessarily fatal to his proposition.  I conclude with several  
suggestions as to how one might escape the creating around paradox, 
and argue that Fishman’s theory might yet inform our understanding 
of copyright law’s purposes. 
II.  A CONSTRAINT CONUNDRUM 
Fishman draws heavily on an analogy to patent law’s concept of 
“ inventing around” in developing his theory of creating around in 
copyright.6  Patent law has long recognized and even encouraged the 
practice of inventing around, by which follow-on inventors skirt the 
perimeter of exclusive rights in a previous invention as defined in the 
written claims of a patent.7  Decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit have often touted inventing around as 
one of the beneficial features of patent law: patent exclusivity encour-
ages follow-on inventors to develop innovative alternatives to existing 
inventions by requiring new inventors to avoid the zones of previously 
claimed rights.8 
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Patent inventing around is expected to occur as the product of bar-
gaining breakdown.9  Typically it would be in the interest of the  
patent owner to license her existing property so as to forestall the de-
velopment of a competing substitute.  At the same time, it would likely 
be in the interest of a competitor to license the existing patented inven-
tion rather than invest in developing a new substitute, so long as the 
license comes at a cost lower than that required to develop that substi-
tute.  The fact that inventing around occurs indicates that the parties’ 
valuations of the patent were sufficiently divergent that licensing 
failed, and so developing a substitute became the preferable alternative 
for the competitor. 
Fishman’s scenario of creating around presumably relies on a simi-
lar bargaining breakdown.  To take one of his specific examples, he 
points out that George Lucas’ Star Wars was developed because li-
censing negotiations for the existing Flash Gordon property failed; if 
Flash Gordon had been available, Lucas would presumably have used 
it instead.10  In the language of transaction cost economics, the creator 
must decide whether to “make or buy” the creative work — whether 
to invest in production capacity to generate the needed material or to 
license it from elsewhere.11  The economic literature tells us that the 
choice will rest upon the relative costs of developing the material  
versus licensing it, including the likely transaction costs of each alter-
native.12  In Fishman’s terms, if the transaction cost of licensing is 
prohibitive, a creator like Lucas will turn to creating around. 
Indeed, the choice whether to make a new work rather than licens-
ing the old seems to depend on the somewhat counterintuitive  
requirement that Fishman’s proposition would only be expected to 
function in the presence of pervasive and ongoing bargaining break-
down.  If Flash Gordon is unavailable at a competitive licensing price, 
the follow-on creator who is determined to stick with a space opera 
project may develop Star Wars, because that is the next best alterna-
tive.  But consider the situation once Star Wars comes into existence: 
both Flash Gordon and Star Wars must be unavailable at a competi-
tive licensing price before yet another follow-on developer will create 
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around the two existing properties to develop, say, Battlestar 
Galactica.13  And thereafter, all three properties will have to be una-
vailable for licensing before additional space opera projects are inde-
pendently developed via Fishman’s expectation of creating around. 
Speaking more generally, then: If alternative works are available 
for license at a reasonable cost, creators will be inclined to use an exist-
ing work rather than create their own.  But of course if the work is un-
available, the resultant creating around necessarily means that there 
will then be a new alternative to the work that has been created 
around, and that the alternative might subsequently be available for 
licensing.  If it is not available either, successive alternate works may 
be developed via creating around, but as the constellation of similar 
works grows larger, the likelihood increases that one or more will be 
made available for licensing.  Thus future creators will become less 
and less likely to create around and more and more likely to license one 
of the existing substitute works, unless for some reason all of them are 
unavailable at a licensing cost less than the cost of new development. 
One might therefore expect the development of copyright “thick-
ets” in which successively denser entitlements are clustered around an 
existing property, crowding out new follow-on creations resembling 
works already created.  Such thickets have been a concern in the pa-
tent literature, where dense clusters of exclusivity are believed to ham-
per follow-on innovation.14  But it is difficult to detect or even imagine 
a similar concern in copyright.  What I have described above with re-
gard to alternative space operas seems not so much the development of 
tangled and impenetrable copyright thickets as it does the develop-
ment of families of creative works that we term genre.15  Indeed, copy-
right law goes out of its way to foster genre, for example via the scènes 
à faire doctrine that ensures stock characters and situations remain 
readily available in the public domain,16 or via the merger doctrine 
that provides that if there are only a limited number of ways to ex-
press an idea, the vehicles of expression are not subject to copyright.17 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Indeed, Fishman recognizes the need for copyright law to foster al-
ternatives, arguing in favor of a thoughtfully designed fair use de-
fense18 and objecting to the rigid approach some courts have taken to 
music sampling.19  But such alternatives must be unavailable for cre-
ating around to occur.  This suggests that Fishman’s expectation of 
creating around would most likely be realized in a counterfactual  
regime where a single copyright owner always held broad, concentrat-
ed, and monopolistic rights in a particular work, so as to preclude oth-
er alternatives that might be readily licensed instead.  In the patent 
context, this type of broad monopoly is typically thought of as the 
“prospect” entitlement structure associated with the theories of Pro-
fessor Edmund Kitch, who famously articulated an explanation as to 
why patent rights are broadly exclusive.20  But patent law expects in-
venting around to be the exception — even the marginal exception — 
rather than the rule.21  A similar rule of broad copyright entitlements 
would gut Fishman’s argument, ensuring relatively few licensing sub-
stitutes by simultaneously ensuring that creating around seldom  
occurs.  Hence the paradox that the conditions necessary for creating 
around copyright will also tend to prevent it. 
III.  MAINTAINING CREATIVE CONSTRAINT 
If the entitlement structure of copyright does not deter alternatives, 
then we would expect multiple licensing alternatives to be available at 
a cost that makes further creating around unattractive, hamstringing 
the creating around hypothesis.  And yet Fishman offers some specific 
examples of creating around, indicating that it occurs at least some of 
the time.22  Are these marginal or outlying cases, or might they be rep-
resentative of a more common effect that he postulates?  It seems to 
me that at least three plausible hypotheses might be advanced as to 
how creating around might still occur in the face of the paradox I have 
just described. 
First, it may be that classic economic assumptions about rational 
bargaining simply do not operate in this space.  For example, if crea-
tors are overly attached to their creations, they may not be willing to 
license them at any reasonable price, prompting creating around in 
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situations where we would rationally expect licensing to occur.  Much 
of Fishman’s thesis relies upon psychological experiments regarding 
creativity in the face of constraint;23 a nascent literature on bargaining 
and creative works suggests that copyrightable works could be subject 
to an “endowment effect” that causes creators to overvalue them and 
to license less often than we might otherwise anticipate.24  Such over-
valuing might generate the bargaining breakdown necessary to cre-
ating around. 
A second possibility is that potential licensors and licensees might 
systematically fail to reach agreements due to the “muddy” entitle-
ment structure of copyright.25  Fishman complains that copyright’s 
substantial similarity doctrine is overly vague, creating fuzzy bounda-
ries around copyrighted properties, and so putatively making it diffi-
cult for follow-on creators to design around the uncertain borders of 
existing works.26  But fuzzy boundaries can be a feature just as well as 
they can be a bug, deterring overenforcement of copyright against  
follow-on creators.27  Rather than creating an impediment to the  
development of alternatives, such a boundary may be impeding licens-
ing that would otherwise replace the investment in creation of new 
works, thus facilitating creating around.  This possibility suggests that 
Fishman might rescue his larger creating around hypothesis by recon-
sidering the subsidiary need for copyright clarity. 
Third, copyright law does not operate in a vacuum.  Most of the 
examples that Fishman offers, such as those I have considered above, 
are commercial properties that also function as trademarks.   
Nintendo’s Mario and the various characters from Star Wars embody 
valuable reputational capital quite apart from their value as creative 
copyrighted works, and that additional value may radically change the 
mechanics of licensing.  Deciding whether to “make or buy” a trade-
mark is a complicated calculus to add to copyright negotiations,28 and 
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may deter licenses that we might expect to be negotiated were copy-
right alone at issue.  The added trademark value of Flash Gordon or 
Popeye may be more than follow-on creators seeking a copyright li-
cense want to pay.  Thus, creating around may be as much a product 
of trademark or related law as it as a creature of copyright. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Copyright law assumes that a large number of creative alternatives 
are available to express any given idea.  Patent law, on the other hand, 
does not depend on multiple alternatives, but rather tends toward sin-
gular exclusivity.  By drawing on patent doctrine to formulate a theory 
of creative constraint in copyright, Fishman advances a theory in 
which alternatives must be both available and unavailable: as more 
alternatives arise, licensing becomes more likely than creating around.  
I have suggested some ways out of this paradox, and expect that a 
functional theory of creating around would adopt some explanation 
along these or similar lines in order to offer a viable account as to how 
copyright fosters creativity under constraint. 
